|
In 1915 Bulgaria
had practically no war industry. Only the manufacture of explosives,
cartridges, and hand grenades of the Odrin type had been mastered. At the
artillery arsenal in Sofia
and in the ordnance factory in Kazanlyk, some repairs of artillery pieces,
machine-guns, and rifles were carried out. To obtain weapons and ammunition Bulgaria
had to rely on its allies.
The military
convention between Bulgaria, Germany and Austria-Hungary signed by col. Dimitar
Gantchev, gen. von Falkenhayn and gen. Conrad at the German headquarters in
Pless on 6 September 1915 should have regulated the mutual wartime duties and
obligations of the allies, but their haziness and ambiguity led to
considerable misunderstanding and friction between the Bulgarian and the
German headquarters.
The seventh
article of the convention stated that “Germany
declared to be ready to deliver to Bulgaria war material of all kind
as far as this is possible depending on the German own needs of supplying.
The Chief of the General Staff of the German Army have the final decision if
here any differences of opinion should result.”
Just after the signature of the convention, during
the first meeting with the German head of the General War Department of the
Prussian War Ministry, col. Ernst von Wrisberg, col. Gantchev, as head of the
Bulgarian delegation, demanded the most urgent requirements for the Bulgarian
Army : infantry weapons, artillery, ammunition, optical devices, entrenching
tools, signal equipment, cars and lorries, field bridges, aircrafts, medical
materials, but also clothing and equipment for the troops and harnesses. The
total amount of the first Bulgarian order was around 300 000 000 gold marks. It was
followed by further request, and, according with col. von Wrisberg, the total
of the military hardware delivery by Germany
to Bulgaria
during the World War amounted to more than 1 billion of gold marks.
With the beginning of the military operations, col. Gantchev was attached to the German Great
General Headquarters as Bulgarian plenipotentiary, but the Bulgarian
delegation remained in Berlin
to work with the Prussian War Ministry, was even then subordinated to him. At
first this delegation was composed only by col. Yonkov and lt.col. Stoenchov, but during the war the number of its members
increased greatly, and in 1917 it formed a separate bureau, under the
direction of col. Marko Nikiforov. This made more difficult the relationships
between the two allies, because col. Wrisberg, who had a great respect for
col. Gantchev, regarded his successor “der Typus eines politischen
Offiziers”, and considered his arrival not favourable to the negotiations,
that until then had been frank and correct.
Germany too felt the necessity to make easier the
relationship with its allies. Therefore at the beginning of 1917 the Allied
Armies section of the Prussian War Ministry (Abteilung für verbündete Heere, A.11) untill then under the direction of maj. Theodor
Duesterberg, was subdivided into
three different departments : Referat 1 for Turkey, Persia and Transcaucasia,
Referat 2 for Bulgarian and the Greek troops interned at Görlitz, Referat 3
for Austria-Hungary and, after the peace of Bukarest, Romania. They were directed
by majors von Ramsay, Jansen and von Bülow, under maj. Duesterberg supervision.
In Bulgaria at first the task of
examining the requests of the Bulgarian War Ministry was entrusted to the
German military attaché, col. Ewald
von Massow. But he was so loaded down with political-military tasks that he
was not able to pick over personally the great amount of orders that came to
him, and could not correct their amount according with the requirements of
the German industry. To free him from this demanding task, the Prussian War
Ministry sent to Sofia an officer acting
as its own plenipotentiary, at first maj. von Weller, and then maj. Kämmerling. Working in close collaboration with the military
attaché himself they could understand the mechanisms of the Bulgarian
bureaucracy and in a short time they were able to fulfil their task
effectively.
A collecting
area for all the supplies assigned to Bulgaria
was established at Ober-Leschen (Silesia).
All the delivery facilities of the Reich
– both government departments and private companies – should inform it
whenever a delivery was finalized. The shipment could take place only after Ober-Leschen had commanded the delivery. The collecting area, to
which some Bulgarian officers were assigned, received the orders from the
Bulgarian General Intendant through the
Plenipotentiary General Staff Officer of the Direction of the Field Railway
Service assigned to the Railway Transport Section South-east. The supplies
were delivered to Sofia almost entirely via
Beograd – Nish, and in the capital they were re-directed to the Field Army
operating in Macedonia.
This diversion meant a great waste of time, and the Bulgarian Command itself
asked to send the most urgent supplies directly from Nish. This change, even if functional, met
considerable opposition could be introduced only with great difficulties.
Germany begun to
fulfil its obligations after the defeat of Serbian Army, when direct
communications with Bulgaria
were established via Beograd. But the
priority accorded to Turkey
during the last phase of the fighting at Gallipoli and the lack of artillery
of German Army at that time slowed down the supplying of Bulgarian Army.
Actually in
late 1915 German Army had no enough guns to equip its new Divisions. The
number of guns of a Division decreased from 72 at the beginning of the War,
to 48 at the beginning of the 1915, to only 24 in spring
of 1915. In
mid 1915 four units were designed brigades – even if they had 9 infantry
battalions like a Division – because they had only a division – Abteilung –
of field artillery (12 howitzers) each. This lack of artillery ended up in
the second half of 1916. Therefore in 1915-16 Germany
could ship to Bulgaria
only a little number of guns.
The situation
was further worsened by the poor railroad system of the Balkan that delayed
the delivery of the weapons ordered by the Bulgarian Government. The
Bulgarians often thought that the Germans were failing to fulfil their
alliance obligation. For instance on 25 April 1917 a report denounced
that since the beginning of the war only 680 of the 1150 machine guns ordered
in Germany
had been actually delivered.
How many guns
did Germany
give the Bulgarian Army during First World War? I was not able to find an
answer in western sources and I hoped that Bulgarian sources can solve this
problem. Unfortunately although it is relatively well known what was the
inventory of the Bulgarian army in 1915, so far I have not been able to
locate much information on what was available as quantities of military
hardware throughout the years up to 1918.
However we can
make some suppositions. In October 1915 Bulgarian Army had 1231 guns. In
September 1918 it had 1395 guns in the field (British Official History : 1597
– 202 German guns). According with История
на служба "Артилерийско
въоръжение"…, p. 97, on 15 September 1919 the Bulgarian Army had 1956 guns. This means an
increase of 725 artillery pieces. To them we must add the guns that were lost
during the war because destroyed due to faulty ammunition, worn out and captured
or destroyed by the enemy. According with the same book in 1919 the
Interallied Military Control Commission found in Bulgaria 3400 guns of different
calibres and patterns.
According with
Кратък обзор на бойния състав…, p. 118, the Central Powers delivered
to Bulgaria
3127 heavy machine guns, 284 light mortars, 162 medium mortars, 1932 grenade launchers, 8 flame-throwers and 528 artillery pieces. For a comparison, during
WW1 Germany gave to Turkey
557,000 rifles, 100,000 carbines, 559 guns, 30 flame-throwers, 1570 light and
30 heavy machine guns (Erickson). Since Austria-Hungary
sent to the Bulgarian Army at least 120 mountain guns, Germany may have delivered
approximately 300 guns. This amount is very close to the data furnished by
col. Wrisberg, who stated that during World War 1 Germany
gave to Bulgaria
80 field batteries, 13 heavy batteries and 31 individual field guns.
Usually Germany
did not give to his allies the most modern weapons it had. In addition Germany
usually did not give the heaviest guns. During the war in Macedonia there were a little
number of heavy guns, but they were under the direct control of German Army.
However the Bulgaria
was not satisfied with old guns discarded by the German Army. General Kalin
Naydenov, who during the whole conflict was the Minister of War, stated that
some heavy guns ordered in Germany
were not accepted, although ready for the shipment, since they were not of
the last model. Therefore the German factories had to manufacture new guns,
which met the expectations of the Bulgarian purchasers. Unfortunately this
slowed down the delivery of the guns, so much that they could not arrive
before the truce was signed (Снабдяването на армията въ време на война, p.80)
|