The employment of the field artillery in
combat
In 1915 the
Artillery Inspection published a new Наставление за употреблението
на полската
артилерия
въ боя
(Direction for the employment of the field artillery in combat), which
replaced the Instructions
introduced ten years before and stood in force even after the end of the
World War. The text, written by the head of the Line-economic section of the
Artillery Inspection, col. Vladimir Vazov, helped
by the head of the newly established Artillery School, lt.col.
Angel Angelov, reflected the lesson learned of the
Balkan Wars, especially the experience of the siege of Odrin, when the
Bulgarian artillery was employed en masse, concentrating its fire to clear
the way for the attack of the infantry. In fact the direction emphasized the
importance of the concentration of fire, the constant coordination with the
infantry and the employment of the whole artillery – heavy and light – as a
single body. Composition. In 1915 field artillery
included the light field artillery (light field guns, horse guns, mountain
guns, and field and mountain howitzers) and the heavy field artillery (heavy field
guns and howitzers). Light field guns fired time shrapnel against animated
targets and percussion high explosive shells against animate and inanimate targets, while heavy
field guns fired more powerful projectiles at greater ranges. Heavy howitzers
could demolish armoured buildings and casemates. Field artillery dominated
the battlefield with its fire at a range of Artillery division was regarded as the
tactical unit in artillery and a rule it was indivisible. Exceptionally, when
it was necessary to divide it by batteries or detach some sections or also
single guns, if possible, they should be deployed so that at any rate the
division commander could concentrate the fire of many guns on a one point. If necessary, the commanders of some
infantry divisions might use all or part of their artillery to form a great
mass of artillery put under the command of the head of Army artillery. Tactics. The tactical rules
stated that artillery should occupy mainly covered firing positions, be ready
to open fire quickly, to open fire according to necessity, to fire usually at
covered targets, to be employed en masse, and to seek to prevail against the
enemy through the concentration of its fire. Oblique fire was regarded as
more effective. The rate of fire strictly depended upon the importance of the
target. Opening fire at great ranges should be avoided: light field and
mountain guns were more effective at a range of no more than In route
formation the artillery divisions moved in succession, one after the other, an
infantry company being interposed between them, to protect the division
moving behind. When artillery was moving separately a special cover force was
appointed. In battle formation the protection of infantry was assigned only to
the batteries whose flanks were uncovered. During the advance part of the
artillery was attached to the advance guard to aid infantry to clear a hurdle
that it was unable to clear by itself, and to support it if it was suddenly
engaged by the enemy. The artillery of the main body occupied its firing position
only under instruction of the head of the artillery, acting according with
the order of the Army commander. In combat
artillery could be in awaiting position (в очаквателно
положение),
or in position (на позиция);
in this case it could be in action (в действие)
or in observation position (в наблюдателно
положение).
Artillery could occupy covered, masked or open positions, but in any case it
should be deeply entrenched. Columns travelling through a mountainous ground
should receive less artillery. At
the beginning of the battle the artillery drew to itself the enemy fire, in
order to make easier the quick approaching of the infantry to the points
of attack, then with a powerful fire it reduced the most important forces of
the enemy artillery to silence. In the meanwhile some detached batteries or divisions could achieve
other temporary goals, supporting their infantry. The whole
artillery or at least the most part of the batteries should be placed under
the command of the high-ranker artillery officer. Both in attack and in
defence, infantry should always stay at less than 500-600 paces before its
artillery. In the event of a defeat, infantry units and machine guns placed
near the artillery had the duty of fighting to the last man in order to
prevent at any price the enemy to capture of the guns. Attack. The tactics of the offensive combat was not
greatly changed from the Instructions
adopted in Defence. The tactics of the
defensive combat, on the other hand, was greatly updated and developed,
tacking account also of the defeats suffered during the Interallied
war. The Direction reasserted that the key of the defence was the position of
the artillery that therefore should be deployed, choosing its positions
before infantry. In defence artillery occupied mainly covered positions and
by all means should be carefully entrenched and masked. It was emplaced by
groups of divisions, spread in depth along the front, in order to be
protected against the fire of two enemy artillery divisions at the same time.
If possibly some reserve trenches were prepared, where the guns would be
placed when the enemy had exactly adjusted the fire against the emplacements
occupied at the beginning of the combat. The bulk of the artillery, under the
direction of the high-ranked artillery officer, was placed in the most
important sectors of the defensive positions and against the most crucial
avenues of approach. The main task
of the artillery was to crush the
enemy offensive, acting in concert with its infantry. It should concentrate
its fire against the targets that time by time proved to be most dangerous
and supported more effectively the assault, but it should avoid to fire at
great ranges, unless the target was wide and deep. If necessary, the
artillery pulled back by echelons, withdrawing
at first the batteries placed forward, screened by the rearward batteries or
by the fire of the nearby sectors. In some cases the artillery should keep
its position, continuing to fight to the end without being able to withdraw
its guns. This exceptional instance should be fixed by the head of the troops
with an express order. In such circumstances the loss of the guns was not
regarded as dishonour or a crime. Command. The commander
of the larger artillery unit attached to a main body of troops, such as an
Army or a Detachment, was the head of the whole artillery assigned,
permanently or even temporarily, to it, independently of the kind of
artillery (field, mountain, howitzers and so on). So the commander of the
artillery brigade was the head of the whole divisional artillery, while every
army had a special head of the artillery. In lesser temporary detachments the
head of the artillery was the commander of the artillery regiment or
division. The Army
commander could take part of the divisional batteries and form with them a
large mass of artillery, put under the direction of his head of the
artillery, in order to achieve the common goal of the Army. The direction
specified that it was not necessary that all the massed batteries were placed
in the same place, it was enough that the Army commander fixed which units
should be put under the direction of the head of the artillery. The head of
the artillery was regarded as guilty of a wrong allocation or an incorrect
direction of the artillery along with the head of the troops, if he had not
reported his motivated opinion on the question in good time. After having
been fully informed about the plans of the head of the troops and having
received his orders and instructions, the head of the artillery left the
headquarters and took up the direction of the artillery. During the battle he
should not left his observatory and the artillery position, staying
constantly in contact with the head of the troops by telephone or through
orderlies. Reconnaissance. As for the
different kind of reconnaissance (remote, close, direct) the direction
basically repeated what had been written previously. All the artillery
commanders should constantly observe the battlefield with field glasses,
battery telescopes, rangefinders and so on. The head
of the artillery reconnoitred the battlefield along with the head of the
troops in order to choose where the guns should be placed. The artillery
positions were personally reconnoitred by the head of the artillery with his
subordinates (division and battery commanders). The head of the troops was in
charge of the security of the artillery permanently or temporarily put under
his command. The head of the artillery should provide with scouts and guards
only when this protection was lacking. Liaison. The liaison between the commanders was provided by
means of all the available technical devices (telephone, telegraph,
heliograph, airplanes, flaying post), while between the lesser artillery
units even by means of flags (by day) or lamps (at night), through written
messages sent by the commander or by word of mouth. As a rule the
liaison was established : – in general,
from the lower-ranking to higher-ranking commanders, – between
different branches of the army, from the artillery to the infantry; – between nearby
artillery units, from right to left; – between different artillery echelons, backwards. To establish
communications with the infantry, the artillery units sent to the infantry
commander a liaison officer or non commissioned officer with some orderlies, equipped with
telephones and perspective sketches of the countryside prepared by the
artillery units. In order not to suffer losses from its own artillery,
infantry should warn this danger with a sign fixed in advance (flag, rocket,
bangers or bonfire) or in another way. Conduct of fire. The direction emphasized
that the success of the action of the artillery depended entirely on a good
direction of the fire. Artillery fire should be chiefly conducted with
“powerful, brief whirlwinds or
hurricanes” (вихрове
или ураганени),
firing the fixed number of rounds as quickly as possible. This kind of fire
aimed to break up the spirit and destroy the force of the enemy. The
“hurricanes of destruction” (урагани
на поражение)
should be fired only after an accurate adjustment, since incorrect firing
data could not be compensated increasing the number of the rounds fired or
lengthening the duration of the bombardment. During the pause between two
“hurricanes” artillery could carry out a “slow fire” (бавен
огън), in order to frighten
the enemy or obtain new and more complete firing data. The artillery
fire could be really timely and effective only by means of a constant
observation of the battlefield, a strict liaison between the artillery units
and between the artillery and the other branches of the army with the
exchange of observers, and a careful preparation of the fire, both
technically and tactically, thanks to an adjustment that should be as full as
possible. A great
dispersion of the fire should be avoided, since it did not permit to achieve
a decisive success promptly and rapidly. The best way to obtain a rapid
defeat of the enemy was the concentration of the fire of several batteries,
combining frontal and oblique fire. The concentration of fire by a great mass
of artillery (many divisions) appeared in the co-ordination, aiming and
production of a powerful fire under the direction of a single head in order
to achieve one common goal. Concentrated fire was considerably more
effective, when it was mixed, namely when the same target was bombed at the
same time by heavy and light field artillery with percussion and time fire. Artillery
should open fire suddenly in order to take the enemy by surprise. The fire at
a given target lasted until the task assigned to the batteries was performed,
after that it ceased or was transferred on a new target. The change of the
target entailed a waste of time, since it usually needed a new adjustment.
Therefore it should be avoided as much as possible. Firing to destroy
fortified buildings or local objects was useful only when it could facilitate
the action of the infantry. Important targets were also observatories,
headquarters, scouts, balloon and aeroplanes. As a rule the
head of the artillery and the division commanders took charge of the tactical
fire control, while the battery commanders of the technical conduct of the
fire. To shoot without fearing to damage the troops placed on its trajectory,
artillery should keep the safety distance : on
smooth ground Supplying. In this connection the direction repeated what the Additional
instructions published in
1913 stated about the need of reduce as much as possible the waste of
ammunition. |